Board Independence and Firm Financial Performance: Context of Publicly Traded Manufacturing Companies in Bangladesh by Maniruzzaman, Md. & Hossain, Syed Zabid
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.11, No.33, 2019 
 
97 
Board Independence and Firm Financial Performance: Context of 




Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University of Rajshahi 
PO box 6205, Rajshahi, Bangladesh 
 
Syed Zabid Hossain 
Professor 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University of Rajshahi 
PO box 6205, Rajshahi, Bangladesh 
 
Abstract 
This study strives to investigate the effects of board independence on financial performance of publicly held 
manufacturing companies in Bangladesh using both accounting (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) performance 
measures. Initially, we select 150 manufacturing companies but only 85 companies remain in the study sample 
after fulfilling the data availability criteria over a period from 2006-2017.  The OLS regression model reveals that 
board independence has positive effects on both ROA and Tobin’s Q, which supports some prior studies (Pearce& 
Zahra, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Ezzamel&Watson, 1993; Hossain, Prevost &Roa, 2001; Choi, Park &Yoo, 
2007; Joh& Jung, 2012), but the relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q are not statistically 
significant. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) has made it a mandatory requirement in the 
corporate governance guidelines to include1/5th of the total directors as independent directors  into corporate 
boards for bringing transparency and accountability of its affairs without considering the underlying institutional 
differences. Though board independence is considered as an important mechanism of corporate board practices in 
most of the developed economies, it is still less appealing in emerging economies, especially in Bangladesh.  
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1.  Introduction 
Following the collapse of some giant corporate entities around the world, most of the companies realize the pivotal 
roles played by the independent directors as their presence add extra monitoring ability on the corporate board 
which creates a barrier against the self-interest behavior of the agents (Shleifer&Vishny, 1997).But, an independent 
director “… should be independent of management and free from anybusiness or other relationship which could 
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding (The 
Cadbury Report (992, Code 2.2).” The Cadbury Report in 1992 and the Tyson Report in 2003 discuss in detail the 
role and duties of an independent director and both the reports mentioned that the presence of independent directors 
into the corporate board ensures diversity in knowledge and culture which indeed excels the effectiveness of the 
corporate board.  In the corporate world, the board independence is the most important governance variable as it 
ensures transparency and accountability (Hasanet.al., 2014a). Independent directors can put forward their impartial 
outlook and actively take part in board discussion and decision-making process. They are supposed to speak for 
the interest of shareholders especially minority atomistic shareholders and protect their interest. Thus the 
independent directors should ensure their presence and performance in the board without prejudice and free from 
any influence of insiders, such as corporate management, executive directors, and the dominant shareholder (if 
any).   
The followers of agency theory believe that there is a sharp contrast exists between principals and agents 
arising from the separation of ownership and control. Agency theory portrays that an individual tends to show 
opportunistic behavior rather than altruistic. In line with this thought, the agency theorists assume that agency 
conflict may happen if the board is controlled by insiders only (see Bathala& Rao, 1995; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; 
Zahra &PearceII, 1989). Moreover, a corporate board dominated by insiders may create information asymmetry, 
and thus lessen the monitoring ability of the board (Solomon, 2007). Dominant insiders may show self-interest 
behavior to exploit personal benefits at the cost of the organization’s economic interests (Deegan, 2006). Hence, 
agency theorists believe that board having a large number of independent directors may independently observe 
and guide managers to defend shareholders’ interests (Brickley& Zimmerman, 2010). The division of roles may 
facilitate boards to carry out their oversight functions more effectively, and thus boards are supposed to be 
independent (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Through accentuating the probable difference of interests between 
shareholders and managers, agency theory anticipates a positive relationship between board independence and 
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firm financial performance (Fama, 1980; Scott, 1983; Boyd, 1995). Thus the more the board's independence, the 
more would be the corporate performance. 
In contrast, the main assertion of stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994) is that executive 
directors are the best stewards of their firm, and thus managerial ownership will add value to the firm. Following 
this theory, it is argued that directors and/or managers spend their working lives in the company they govern; 
therefore, they must understand the business (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994). Besides, with their ownership 
rights, they can make better decisions (Nicholson and Kiel 2007). Thus stewardship theory proposes that 
independent directors are unnecessary as agents are the best stewards for their organizations and are not influenced 
by personal goals (Davis et al., 1997; Luan & Tang, 20`07). Even so, we believe that individuals are opportunistic 
and self-interested, rather than compassionate, thus there is a need for monitoring by independent directors. 
Against this backdrop, the present study strives to investigate the effects of board independence on corporate 
performance to test the theoretical propositions of the agency theory.    
The core function of a corporate board is to formulate corporate policy and strategy to accomplish the 
objectives of the corporate entity. Besides, the board also undertakes controlling functions to observe whether the 
company is on the right track or not (Zinkin, 2010). Independent directors are appointed considering their 
knowledge, skill, and aptitude so that they can contribute to the corporate value creation through active and 
independent participation in the decision making process of the board. Independent directors are supposed to be 
independent of any control. Corporations appoint independent directors to monitor the performance of executives 
and top management. Zinkin (2010) mentioned that independent directors should focus on strategy formulation 
and implementation. Besides, they should ask questions about the businesses that the company ventures in, product 
market segmentation, and the valuable customers within the market segmentation (Fuzi, Rahim and Tan, 2012). 
Independent directors having diversified knowledge and expertise in the relevant field would be more willing to 
challenge the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the management team in board decision making. Board 
independence ensures good corporate governance, which is a prerequisite for attracting the required capital to 
ensure continued economic growth and also for maintaining better relations with workers, creditors, and other 
stakeholders (Hasanet.al., 2014b). 
 
2. Literature Review 
The concept of board independence has emerged from the context of Anglo-American countries due to scattered 
ownership pattern of corporations. Thus independent directors’ dominated corporate boards have been popular in 
the United States since the 1960s (Kesner, Victor & Lamont, 1986). However, researchers have failed to reach a 
consensus as to whether the presence of independent directors into the corporate boards enhances firm performance.  
Several empirical studies in the developed economies (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Ezzamel& 
Watson, 1993; Prevost &Roa, 2001; Choi, Park&Yoo, 2007; Joh& Jung, 2012) have found a positive association 
between board independence and corporate performance. On the contrary, some previous studies have documented 
a negative association between board independence and corporate financial performance (Grace, Ireland & 
Dunstan, 1995; Baysinger& Butler,1985; Bhagat& Black,2002; & Sharma,1985; Hermalin&Weisbach, 2003; 
Rechner& Dalton,1986; Yermack, 1996). Some empirical studies from emerging economies have also shown a 
negative association between board independence and corporate financial performance (Rashid, DeZoysa, 
Lodh&Rudkin, 2010; Rashid, DeZoysa, Lodh&Rudkin, 2012). However, some studies have found no significant 
effect, either positive or negative, of board independence on corporate financial performance (Muth, M. M. and 
Donaldson, L, 1998).  
As the empirical findings of the studies on the association between board independence and corporate 
financial performance showed a  mixed result, Dalton and Daily (1999) defined these findings as “vexing”, 
“contradictory”, “mixed” and “inconsistent”. The empirical findings suggest that there is logic to opine that the 
presence of independent directors in the corporate board can ensure good governance or better financial 
performance. Similarly, there is no predicted relationship between board independence and corporate financial 
performance using either accounting or market-based measures. The heterogeneous empirical evidence and 
findings on the relationship between board independence and corporate financial performance may be the outcome 
of limited methodological procedures or a lack of methodological rigor and model misspecifications in the sense 
of the omission of variables that affect firm performance (Bathala& Rao, 1995), differences in institutional factors 
and managerial behaviors in the market (Fan, Wei &Xu, 2011). Thus the current study has been undertaken to 
reinvestigate the impact of board independence on corporate financial performance in a developing country context. 
 
3. Board independence in the context of Bangladesh 
The main focus of agency theory is to protect and manage shareholders’ interests through minimizing agency costs 
arises from the opportunistic and self-interest behavior of agents. The agency cost could be minimized by including 
independent directors on the board as they monitor the activities of corporate management (Jenson and Meckling, 
1776). This study applies agency theory to justify the relationship between independent directors and corporate 
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financial performance. Corporations in Bangladesh are found to be concentrated ownership which poses some 
difficulties in ensuring board independence as persons appointed as independent directors are either from a 
company’s family-based relationship or as a payback of previous favor (Rashid 2017). Hence most independent 
directors are friends or friends of friends of the controlling family. It is very difficult to attain board independence 
in Bangladesh and consequently, the board loses its monitoring power over the actives of management. Thus the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance may be negative in emerging markets. As boards 
are not independent enough to control the affairs of management in emerging economies, unacceptable or modified 
outcomes may be the result.   Hence, good performing companies may be reluctant to appoint the required number 
of independent directors to gain legitimacy. Contrarily, poorly performing companies may tend to enhance the 
number of independent directors into the board as an effort to improve performance. (Bhagat& Black, 2002). 
Besides, most cor[orations in developing countries, particularly in Bangladesh, invest their undiversified human 
capital in a single firm and they expect some degree of opportunistic and self-interested behavior from their human 
assets. Hence, board independence may be a balancing force between the board and management 
(Hillman&Dalziel, 2003; Kula, 2005; Zahra and PearceI, 1989). The researchers are motivated to investigate the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance of publicly traded manufacturing companies in 
the context of Bangladesh. Besides, Bangladesh follows the Anglo-American style of corporate governance, where 
there is no supervisory board, corporate boards are one-tire in nature in which both inside directors and outside 
directors work in one organizational layer (Rashid, 2013). The CEO duality remains in many listed companies in 
Bangladesh. Despite having some similarities in corporate governance practices in Bangladesh with the Anglo-
American countries, say, one-tier board, CEO duality, and common law tradition, most of the firms in Bangladesh 
are controlled by the family members of the founding family (Maniruzzaman and Hossain, 2019). Similar to other 
emerging economies, representatives of the family owners hold positions in both the company board and 
management as opposed to professional managers in Anglo-American countries, leading to poor monitoring and 
controlling, as well as to incidences of CEO duality in many listed firms in Bangladesh. Such family control is 
sometimes detrimental to corporate financial performance.  
In August 2012, the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), the capital market regulator, 
made the Corporate Governance Notification (CGN) mandatory with some modifications. Amongst other 
requirements, publicly traded companies in Bangladesh requires to have at least one-fifth (1/5) of the total number 
of directors shall be independent directors like Anglo- American-style independent directors on their boards. This 
idea of independent  directors work good in the Anglo-American countries, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada,  as the control of these countries rely deeply on laws and transparency (information 
disclosure) to enforce shareholders’ rights (Asian Development Bank,2000). As opposed to Anglo-American 
countries, key institutional forces have a very negligible capacity to exercise pressure on corporate management 
(agent) to discipline them. Rashid (2011) opined that, due to poor enforcement of the law, shareholders right is 
very poorly protected in Bangladesh; many companies take up to seven years to present their audited financial 
statements before the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and some even take more than seven years just to disclose 
the audited financial statements to the outsiders. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) noted that families and their kith 
and kin sometimes weaken the legal measures, for example, rules and regulations for accountability. In this 
situation, it is imperative to investigate whether the Western-dominated corporate governance system of board 
independence can work effectively in an emerging economy. 
 
4. Hypothesis development 
The rationale behind supporting board independence through the representation of outside directors on boards is 
that the outsiders can make a positive contribution to the monitoring abilities of boards (Park & Shin,2004) and 
thereby, increases corporate financial performance and firm value (see Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Kesner et 
al., 1986; Zahra and PearceII,1989 ). In the absence of independent directors, the insider-dominated board can get 
massive power that it may misuse. Moreover, without the expertise of independent directors, a board may be 
ineffective (Dalton &Daily, 1999) and lead to information asymmetry. Agency theorists argue that the most critical 
board function is to monitor the actions of “agents” (managers) to safeguard the interest of “principals” 
(shareholders) (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Hillman &Dalziel, 2003). Under the agency theory, board independence 
balances the power between insiders and outsiders. Following this rationale, it is argued that board independence 
augments corporate financial performance. 
But, there exist some institutional and behavioral differences between companies in emerging countries and 
those in developed countries (Fan et al. 2011). As the corporate ownerships are spread out to a large number of 
shareholders, corporations in developed countries hire highly skilled professional managers, many of them do not 
have ownership stakes in their companies, whereas in many emerging countries the family owners choose 
themselves or their close relatives or friends to appoint on corporate boards and management. Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) argue that families often try to reduce the presence of independent directors as they have a great incentive 
to consume the resources of their companies. Although many companies appoint independent directors on their 
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boards, these directors may not be truly independent. It is not surprising that many of them are friends or friends 
of friends of the controlling family or inside directors. Thus, board independence is difficult to achieve in some 
emerging economies and the board cannot exercise effective control over agents (managers). Thus board 
independence seldom adds any value to corporate entities in emerging markets and a negative relationship quite 
common between board independence and corporate financial performance. Based on the above discussion, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: Board independence and corporate financial performance are negatively associated with one another. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Population and sampling 
Booth et al. (2002) mention that along with a company's internal mechanisms, industry-specific regulations also 
shape managers’ discretion and thus affect corporate financial performance. It is logical to point out that companies 
with higher regulatory intervention may weaken corporate governance mechanisms, such as banks and financial 
institutions. Therefore, we limit our sample only to manufacturing companies as it encounters less rigorous 
industry regulations. We follow the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) industry classification to identify manufacturing 
companies for the period of 2006-2017. Initially, we take 150 manufacturing companies, but the annual reports are 
available for 85 companies since the sample is drawn from companies listed on the DSE on or before 2006. The 
sample size is representative of the population as the market capitalization of 85 sample companies is 69.02% of 
the total market capitalization of all the listed manufacturing companies in Bangladesh as of December 31, 2017. 
Chauhan et al. (2016) conduct a study in India for the period 2003-2013, where they included all the manufacturing 
companies in India and initially found a total of 970 companies but annual reports were available for 84 companies 
representing the market capitalization of 55.49%. Rashid (2016) also conducted a study in Bangladesh for the 
period of 2001-2011 with the sample of all non-financial companies listed on the DSE, but based on the availability 
of annual reports; his sample includes only 110 companies, resulting in a balanced sample of 1210 observations. 
 
5.2 Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
The study has adopted two alternative measures to assess corporate performance, one is Return on Assets (ROA) 
and the other is Tobin’s Q. ROA is the backward-looking accounting measure of financial performance and Tobin’s 
Q is the forward-looking market measure of financial performance (Farooque et al., 2012). However, the capital 
market in Bangladesh is underdeveloped and highly volatile in nature, and thus market-based measure is not greatly 
responsive to corporate financial performance. Thus accounting-based measures ROA (return on assets) have been 
used in this study as it reflects the underlying company’s financial performance (Maniruzzaman& Hossain, 2019). 
However, the current study uses Tobin’s Q as an alternative performance measure of corporate performance. Board 
independence is the independent variable of the study, which is measured as the ratio of independent directors to 
the total number of members on the board, which is denoted as BDIND. Besides, the current study uses some 
control variables, such as firm size, firm age, and industry category. Firm size is the log value of the total assets of 
the companies and denoted as FZIZE. Firm age refers to the number of years since a company enlisted into the 
DSE and denoted as FAGE. Food and Allied sector is a reference category that takes a value zero. In Bangladesh, 
the manufacturing companies are divided into nine different sectors as per the DSE listing, which are Cement, 
Ceramics, Paper & Printing, Engineering, Jute, Textile, Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, Tannery, and Food & Allied. 
Statistical model 
To investigate effect of board independence on firm performance, the current study developed the following OLS 
regression model: 
 =  +  × 
 +  +  
Where, 
is alternatively  and 
′  

is the board independence for
ℎ firm at time t. 
is the control variables used in the study. 
is the intercept, β1, β2, β3, andβ4 are the regression co-efficient 
is the error terms 
 
5.3 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics reveal that the average financial performance of the sample companies as measured by ROA 
is 8.91 percent ranging from (-) 26 to 56 percent and as measured by Tobin’s Q is 106.73 percent ranging from 51 
to 152 percent over the period 2006-2017. This situation suggests that for each BDT 100 invested in assets there 
is a return of BDT 6.73. The average board independence of the sample companies is 1.3943 that reveals on average 
more than one independent director sits on the corporate board. The average firm size (log value) of the 
manufacturing companies is 6.9285 ranging from 2.90 to 10.75. The average log-asset value of each manufacturing 
company is BDT 6.9285. Similarly, the average log firm age is 2.9131 years. 
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Table-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 ROA Tobin’s Q BDIND LEV FSIZE FAGE 
Mean .0891 1.0673 1.3943 .6072 6.9285 2.9131 
Median .0751 1.0552 1.0000 .5498 6.9200 2.9957 
Std. Deviation .09347 .11570 .66433 .41166 1.48003 .47382 
Minimum -.26 .51 1.00 .01 2.90 .00 
Maximum .56 1.52 5.00 4.48 10.75 3.71 
To see whether there is any multicollinearity problem associated with variables used in this study, we 
conducted a Person correlation analysis on the variables in table 2. The results show that ROA and Tobin’s Q are 
positively correlated. Besides, board independence and firm age are also positively correlated with ROA and 
Tobin’s Q but financial leverage is negatively correlated with ROA which in turn positively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q and firm size is positively correlated with ROA but negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Simple 
correlation is not harmful unless they exceed 0.80 or 0.90 (Judge et al. (1985); Bryman and Cramer (1997); Hasan 
et.al., (2014b); Mehedi et.al., 2017. In the interpretation of the results of the multiple regression analysis, the 
correlation matrix reveals none of the results exceed 0.5 and hence, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
Table-2 Correlations coefficient matrix 
 ROA Tobin’s Q BDIND LEV FSIZE FAGE 
ROA 1      
Tobin’s Q .231** 1     
BDIND .076* .033 1    
LEV -.345** .078* .025 1   
FSIZE .280** -.253** .121** -.210** 1  
FAGE .180** .217** .187** .006 .093** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
It is evident from table- 3 that board independence, firm size, and firm age are positively, and financial 
leverage is negatively associated with ROA, and the associations are statistically significant. Similarly, board 
independence, financial leverage, and firm age are positively associated with Tobin’s Q, but only the firm age is 
statistically significant. Contrarily, firm size is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and the association is 
significant. Contrarily, firm size is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and the association is significant. 
Independent Directors are appointed on the board to look after the interest of the atomistic minority shareholders 
and ensure that any deceitful or inept action of corporate management should not go unnoticed. In a perfect world, 
independent directors should have the independence of mind along with the ability and ethical foundation to judge 
an issue without prejudice or bias towards the interest of any individual or group of individuals. But in the context 
of developing economies, especially in Bangladesh, the situation is somewhat different.  
In most cases, independent directors usually try to protect the interest of dominant majority shareholders 
instead of minority shareholders and all other stakeholders. The most revealing feature is that the appointment of 
independent directors is normally controlled by the dominant majority shareholders. Moreover, it is difficult to 
find any truly independent person for appointing as an independent director in corporate boards. In such a situation, 
the BSEC could prepare a panel of deserving candidates having a sound ethical and professional background and 
make it mandatory to appoint independent directors from that panel following a chronological order. Consequently, 
board independence and corporate financial performance will increase. There will be a win-win situation both for 
the minority and majority/ controlling shareholders and good governance will prevail in Bangladesh corporate 
sector.  
On the other hand, control variables such as firm size and firm age are positively associated with ROA and 
the results are statistically significant. One possible explanation is that the older firm and the larger the size, the 
higher the firm performance (Dey et al., 2018) However, firm size is negatively and firm age is positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q and in both the cases the results are statistically significant. Another revealing feature 
is that all the sectors under manufacturing category are negatively associated with ROA` and the results are 
statistically significant. Similarly, all sectors are negatively associated with Tobin’s Q except cement sector and 
the results are statistically significant in case of Ceramics, Paper, Engineering, Jute and Textile sectors but in case 
of Cement, Pharmaceuticals and Tannery sectors, the regression results are not statistically significant.  
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Table 3. Regression results 
Variables ROA Tobin’s Q Collinearity Statistics 
 Beta T Sig.  Beta T Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -4.119 .000  30.986 .000   
BDIND .097 2.664 .008 .038 1.079 .281 .735 1.360 
LEV -.075 -2.150 .032 .053 1.570 .117 .798 1.252 
FSIZE .258 7.094 .000 -.436 -12.305 .000 .729 1.372 
FAGE .262 7.145 .000 .173 4.824 .000 .716 1.397 
Cement -.227 -5.496 .000 .074 1.831 .067 .567 1.765 
Ceramics -.265 -7.427 .000 -.101 -2.904 .004 .757 1.321 
Paper -.103 -3.218 .001 -.039 -1.249 .212 .936 1.068 
Engineering -.353 -7.881 .000 -.075 -1.717 .086 .481 2.079 
Jute -.234 -6.503 .000 -.147 -4.199 .000 .745 1.342 
Textile -.473 -9.430 .000 -.154 -3.151 .002 .384 2.605 
Pharmaceuticals -.246 -5.198 .000 .082 1.777 .076 .432 2.313 
Tannery -.194 -5.198 .000 -.032 -.882 .378 .696 1.438 
Dependent variable: ROA Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
F statistics 14.216 16.627 
Significance .000b .000b 
R Square .316 .350 
*Food and Allied sector is a reference category, which takes a value zero. The manufacturing companies in 
Bangladesh are categorized into nine different sectors as per the Dhaka Stock Exchange, which are Cement, 
Ceramics, Paper, Engineering, Jute, Textile, Pharmaceuticals, Tannery and Food and Allied. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate whether board independence has any effect on corporate financial performance in the context of 
Bangladesh. The OLS regression results show that board independence and corporate financial performance are 
positively associated with each other, which support the findings of some prior studies (Pearce& Zahra, 1991; 
Zahra&Pearce, 1989; Ezzamel&Watson, 1993; Hossain, Prevost &Roa, 2001; Choi, Park &Yoo, 2007; Joh& Jung, 
2012), and the propositions of agency theory. Besides, this finding does not support the assumptions of the 
stewardship theory. However, this finding is contrasting with some other previous studies (Rashid, DeZoysa, 
Lodh&Rudkin, 2010; Rashid, DeZoysa, Lodh&Rudkin, 2012) as they found that board independence is not 
positively associated with firm performance. The main focus of agency theory is to protect the interest of 
shareholders through minimizing agency cost arising from the opportunistic and self-interested behavior of the 
agents which could be reduced by appointing independent directors who will act as a monitor over the activities 
of the management (Jenson and Meckling, 1776). The role of independent directors in the corporate boards in most 
of the manufacturing companies in Bangladesh adds value similar to the Anglo-American countries, though the 
ownership pattern in Bangladesh is concentrated to a few hands as opposed to the many developed countries.  
 
7. Limitation 
This study has several possible limitations. First, the performance measures used in this study may be problematic 
because accounting standards and their enforcement are very poor in developing countries. Thus, annual reports 
may not be a true representation of a company's state of affairs and performance. Moreover, it is argued that 
accounting profits are subject to manipulation (see Healy, 1985; Chakravarthy, 1986; Capon, Farley&Hoenig, 
1996, p89). Similarly, the market performance measure (Tobin's Q) used in this study may be problematic. To 
apply the stock market performance of the firm, its stock prices must reflect the firm's true value (Lindenberg& 
Ross, 1981). Market-based performance measures are also criticized because they may not be ‘efficient contracting 
parameters’ or be “driven by many factors beyond the control of firm executives” (Bacidore, Boquist, 
Milbourn&Thakor, 1997, p11). Bangladesh is not exception to this. The Bangladeshi stock market underwent 
major turmoil in 1996 and 2011 that led to market collapse, even though the market was outperforming the markets 
of many developed economies before it collapsed (see Rashid, 2011). Secondly, the accounting data were collected 
from a large number of observations of different corporate entities while ignoring the underlying differences in 
organizations (Deegan, 2006). Finally, the extreme values of some observed variables, such as EBIT and the 
accumulated profits of a few firms for certain years, may severely impact the outcome of this study. Noting the 
study limitations outlined above, future studies that examine the relationship between board independence and 
agency cost or firm efficiency should be carried out. Agency cost or firm efficiency can be measured as:(a) the 
expense ratio(ER)and(b)the asset utilization ratio(AUR) or assets turnover ratio, also known as agency cost (see 
Angetal., 2000; Rashid &Hoque,2011; Rashid, 2013; Singh and Davidson, (2003). 
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